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This paper derives new results on the e¤ects of employing Taylor
rules in economies that are subject to real market imperfections such
as production externalities. Taylor rules that aggressively respond to
output can eliminate sunspot equilibria that arise from the increas-
ing returns. The paper also …nds that rules which should be chosen
(avoided) in perfect market environments often yield (ensure) mul-
tiple (unique) rational expectations solutions in alternative settings.
Therefore, exact knowledge on the degree of market imperfection may
be pivotal for robust policy advice.
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1 Introduction
The Taylor (1993) rule provides a good description of how many central
banks attempt to set interest rates in order to achieve stable prices while
avoiding large ‡uctuations in output and employment. There is increasing
evidence, however, that Taylor rules can be a source of economic instabil-
ity by themselves. For example, Benhabib et al. (2001) demonstrate that
steering under such policy may introduce real indeterminacy in an otherwise
determinate economy. As a consequence, the Taylor rule debate frequently
advises the monetary authority to assign aggressive backward-looking princi-
ples in which interest rates respond to predetermined variables, in particular
to in‡ation (see for example Carlstrom and Fuerst, 1999, and Benhabib et
al., 2003).
The present paper quali…es this assertion by suggesting that before spelling
out concrete policy rules, the monetary authority must …rst be au courant
with the speci…c economic environment. Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000, 2001)
have demonstrated how monetary policy should depend on the timing con-
vention in monetary models. The present paper adds another dimension to
the discussion: the real side of the economy. In particular, it demonstrates
that the presence of mild forms of market imperfections – modelled as arising
from production externalities – may have fundamental consequences on how
monetary policy should be conducted.
The motivation for the current research stems from the insights of recently
formulated non-monetary dynamic general equilibrium models with sunspot
equilibria and self-ful…lling prophecies.1 In these models the possibility of a
continuum of equilibria is the consequence of empirically plausible market
imperfections – therefore, sunspot equilibria are more than theoretical cu-
riosities. The present paper combines the two branches of the indeterminacy
literature by money-augmenting these real models in order to examine the
e¤ects of monetary policy on indeterminacy as well as to assess monetary pol-
icy recommendations in suboptimal economies. The framework I will draw
on is Wen (1998) which is currently the most successful attempt in terms
of obtaining sunspot equilibria at small increasing returns and in generating
realistic business cycles (see also Benhabib and Wen, 2003).
1A partial list includes Benhabib and Nishimura (1998), Christiano and Harrison
(1999), Farmer and Guo (1994), Perli (1998), Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997), Weder
(1998, 2001), and Wen (1998).
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1.1 Main results
Given its relation to recent policy-proposals (i.e. Carlstrom and Fuerst, 1999,
2000, and Benhabib et al., 2003), the current paper is primarily concerned
with backward-looking Taylor rules. The main …ndings can be stated as
follows: by responding su¢ciently to (past) output movements in setting
the nominal interest rate, the monetary authority can stabilize the (sunspot-
driven) economy. The reasoning is that the nominal interest rate operates
like an in‡ation tax – it distorts market outcomes. By the central bank
…ghting output ‡uctuations, sunspot blips will be dimmed: when the cen-
tral bank builds up the costs of buoyant expectations these will no longer
be sustainable in the …rst place. Phrased alternatively, the in‡ation tax-
distortions operate by defeating the e¤ects of high increasing returns to scale
and non-fundamental equilibria can be removed.
I also …nd that Taylor rules work quite di¤erently depending on the fun-
damentals of the economy. In fact, it appears to be the case that strate-
gies which should be chosen (avoided) in perfect markets environments do
in fact yield multiple (unique) rational expectations solutions in alternative
settings. For example, backward-looking policy settings that ensure unique
rational expectations in cases of constant returns to scale (aggressive with
respect to in‡ation and modestly passive with respect to output) are con-
nected to determinacy at moderate imperfections and vice versa. On the
other hand, current-looking rules which always create indeterminacy under
constant returns are a vehicle to remove technology-based sunspot equilib-
ria. Consequently, the central bank should have a clear picture of market
imperfections before setting policy rules. Existing empirical studies do not
provide an unambiguous answer on the extent of the imperfections.
1.2 Related work
The argument which is developed in the current paper is framed within a
fully speci…ed cash-in-advance environment which has been shown by Carl-
strom and Fuerst (2000) to have fundamentally di¤erent policy implications
than New-IS-LM or money-in-utility-frameworks.2 My study di¤ers from
theirs in three key aspects, however. First, their production technology is
constant returns to scale. By contrast, I allow empirically plausible produc-
tion externalities which lead to increasing returns. Second, in their model
the central bank’s nominal interest rate targets in‡ation only. The current
paper considers versions of the original Taylor rule in which the interest rate
is increased or decreased according to what is happening to both real GDP
2King (2000) is a good review of the New-IS-LM model.
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and to in‡ation – as it turns out, output-targeting becomes essential in elim-
inating sunspot equilibria in imperfect economies. Furthermore, I present
new results on interest smoothing.
The work here also shares similarities with Christiano (2000). Never-
theless, it di¤ers from his analysis in several important ways. Christiano
introduces money into the Christiano and Harrison (1999) model which as-
sumes increasing returns to scale equal the inverse of the capital share. As a
consequence, the model has two stationary states. In his model, the monetary
authority sets the nominal interest rate proportional to the contemporaneous
employment level and is thereby able to eliminate endogenous sunspot cycles
in the neighborhood of one of the steady states. The present paper does not
rest on scale economies that fault on empirical …ndings: the economy does
not move between two steady states therefore the choice and also the optimal
set of policy di¤ers. More concretely, the monetary rule which is proposed
by Christiano does not generally deliver determinacy at modest increasing
returns – the present model puts a more stringent cap on policy.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model
economy. Section 3 discusses the connection of monetary policy, market
imperfections and sunspot equilibria. Section 4 addresses issues of interest
smoothing and alternative monetary modelling. Section 5 concludes.
2 The economy
The physical setup of the economy’s real part is a standard real business cycle
model augmented by production complementarities. Currency is introduced
by imposing restrictions on the timing of exchanges.
2.1 Preferences and technologies




¯t(ln ct ¡ ´lt) 0 < ¯ < 1, ´ > 0
where ¯, ct and lt are the discount factor, consumption and labor during
t. The household rents labor and capital services to …rms. All markets are
perfectly competitive. The household’s budget constraint can be stated as
Mt+1 + Ptkt+1 =Mt + ¦t + Ptwtlt + Pt(rt + 1¡ ±t)kt ¡ Ptct +Nt(Rt ¡ 1)
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where Pt is the price level, Mt are the cash balances at the beginning of t, wt
is the real wage and rt is the real rental rate of capital, kt. The variable ut
denotes the degree of capital utilization. The depreciation rate of installed




uµt µ > 1:
Nt stands for one-period bank deposits which pay a short-term nominal inter-
est given byRt. ¦t is the pro…t ‡ow from …rms and intermediaries. A positive
value is assigned to the inconvertible currency by assuming that during the
shopping session the household is subject to the cash-in-advance-restriction
Mt + Ptwtlt ¸ Ptct +Nt
that is, households circulate all their money (plus wage payments) to …rms
by consumption purchases and loans to the …nancial intermediaries.
Output is produced by a large number of competitive …rms with identical
technologies. The economy as a whole is a¤ected by organizational synergies
that cause the output of an individual …rm to be higher if all other …rms in
the economy are producing more. The term At stands for these aggregate
externalities. The production complementarities are taken as given for the
individual optimizer and they cannot be priced or traded. Departures from





®l1¡®i;t At = (utkt)
®l1¡®t and 0 < ® < 1:
Here, kt (lt) denotes – by way of normalization – the economy-wide average
capital (labor) input. Before hiring workers, …rms must borrow cash at the
short term rate from the …nancial intermediaries. This is because they start
the period without sector to …nance their wage bills. This is the second
source of money demand.
2.2 Intermediaries and the central bank
The monetary branch of the economy comes in two parts: the intermediary
sector and the central bank. The perfectly competitive intermediaries have
two sources of cash. They accept loans from the households, Nt, which are
3See Benhabib and Farmer (1994) and others for an alternative (and in reduced-form)
equivalent formulation that incorporates internal increasing returns at the intermediate-
…rm level in an imperfectly competitive market structure without free entry. In that case,
the parameter ° would (also) relate to the monopoly markup.
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repaid at the gross rate of interest Rt. Intermediaries also receive new cash
injections, Mst+1 ¡M st , from the economy’s monetary authority. This money
is loaned to …rms. The intermediaries’ constraint is
Nt +M
s
t+1 ¡Mst ¸ Ptwtlt:
Firms’ loans must be repaid at the end of the period, in time for the …nancial
intermediaries to use the proceeds to repay the households.
Most central banks implement monetary policy by controlling a short-
term nominal interest rate. Accordingly, it has become standard to represent
monetary policy in terms of commitment to a rule for the nominal rate of
interest. In the present paper, the monetary authority sets the short-run
nominal interest rate based on what is happening to both real GDP and







¿ ¸ 0 ! ¸ 0
or in linearized from
bRt+1 = ¿b¼t + !byt
in which the variables appear as percentage deviations from their stationary
states R, ¼ and y. We denote rules with ¿ < 1 (¿ > 1) as passive (aggressive)
since the nominal interest rate moves less (more) than one-for-one with past
in‡ation. Term ! refers to the weight given to deviations of real GDP from
the target level. Since the general equilibrium setting imposes a money de-
mand relationship (that is, the cash-in-advance setup), the interest rate rule
implies that the money supply is endogenous.
2.3 Dynamics and calibration
In what follows, I restrict the analysis to a symmetric equilibrium in which









































Equation (2) describes the leisure-consumption trade-o¤ and (3) pins down
the optimal utilization rate of capital. Equations (4) and (5) are the usual
Fisher and Euler conditions. (6) repeats the intertemporal constraint. No
closed-form solution exists, thus the model must be approximated. In log-

















The dynamical system contains two non-predetermined (or jump) variables:
bct+1 and bRt+2. Therefore, indeterminacy requires that at most one eigenvalue
of the 4£ 4-matrix M is outside the unit circle. Two eigenvalues larger than
one (and two smaller than one) imply determinacy. If, say, exactly three
eigenvalues have modulus less than one, then there are multiple rational



























I will now assign parameter values and demonstrate the empirical plau-
sibility of sunspot equilibria. The time unit is taken to be a quarter of a
year. The calibration is based on empirical observations on post-war U.S.
data. The capital share, ®, is set equal to 30 percent, the discount factor, ¯;
is chosen to be 0:99 and the steady state rate of capital depreciation, ±, is 2:5
percent. The parameter µ can then be derived from steady state conditions:
µ =
1=¯ ¡ 1 + ±
±
= 1:4:
When abstracting from the monetary side, the calibration implies a minimum
degree of externalities, °min, needed for indeterminacy that amount to 0:1037.
The value is reasonable given empirical …ndings. For example, Caballero and
Lyons (1992) obtain increasing returns estimates in the order of 1.26 to 1.56.
Baxter and King (1991) …nd returns to scale of 1.53, however, combined with
a standard error of 0.56. Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (1995) report
a point estimate of 0.98. Again their standard error of 0.34 is large. Basu
and Fernald (1997) also …nd close to constant returns, however, the imparted
estimation-uncertainty is signi…cant again.
The reasoning for multiplicity in the real economy is as follows. Equations
(1) and (3) entail the reduced form-output







Thus, the e¤ective labor-output elasticity is larger than unity for4
° > °up =
®(µ ¡ 1)
® + (1¡ ®)µ > 0:
Accordingly, the reduced-form labor demand curve is upward sloping at mild
increasing returns.5
Now, how do sunspot equilibria come about? Suppose people suddenly
have pessimistic expectations and expect lower future income. The perma-
nent income motive will reduce today’s consumption. The static-…rst order
4If the depreciation costs are high (µ ! 1) and accordingly capital utilization is set
constant by agents, the condition reduces to that found in Harrison and Weder (2002); the
minimum increasing returns fall outside of the plausible region. However, the condition
also implies an upward-sloping labor demand curve and all of the below qualitative results
can be replicated in such an environment.
5Upward sloping labor demand arises for ° ¸ °min ¸ °up = 0:0945. The reason for
the gap between °min and °up and the gap’s positive dependence on the time period’s
length comes from discounting future bene…ts (costs) at the relevant intertemporal mar-
gins. When formulating the model in continuous time, the two thresholds are identical –
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Figure 1: Shock to consumption demand
condition (2) implies that the labor supply schedule moves outwards. Given
the upward sloping equilibrium labor demand curve, employment and invest-
ment will actually both fall today. As a consequence, the future capital stock,
output and consumption will all be low, and in sum, the initially pessimistic
expectations will be self-ful…lled. The sunspot circle is completed.
The determinacy properties of the model do not change when money is
introduced and the central bank pegs the nominal rate one-for-one with past
in‡ation and it does not react to output movements (¿ = 1 and ! = 0).
The minimum increasing returns are 1:1037; the speci…c interest rate policy
causes the economy to behave identically to the model that only includes the
real sector.
It is useful to plot impulse response functions for real output and the
nominal interest rate (which is proportional to one-period-delayed in‡ation)
in the presence of production externalities. I set ¿ = 1, ! = 0 , assume mild
externalities (° = 0:11) and hit the arti…cial economy by a one-time positive
shock to consumption, i.e. the ³t+1¡shock to expectations as in equation
(7).6 Output increases at the demand shocks’s impact – the presence of
aggregate externalities increases labor input such that an expansionary e¤ect
is possible for a given capital stock. Moreover, (i) in‡ation falls in the initial
stages of the economic boom and (ii) the contemporaneous correlation of
output and the short-run nominal interest rate is slightly positive at 0:24.
This is similar to the number for the U.S. economy as reported in Cooley
and Hansen (1995, Table 7.1.).
6To avoid a unit eigenvalue, I calibrate ¿ = 1:001:
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3 How should monetary policy be conducted?
This Section discusses the e¤ects of various versions of the Taylor rule on the
qualitative dynamics of the arti…cial economy. It opens by assuming that the
central bank sets nominal interest rates after having observed (past) in‡ation
and output (Section 3.1.). This is followed by discussions of forward-looking
and current-looking rules (Sections 3.2. and 3.3.).
3.1 Indeterminacy zones with backward-looking rules
This Subsection will examine various versions of backward-looking Taylor
rules in economies with constant and increasing returns to scale. I will start
combing for parametric indeterminacy zones by considering a constant re-
turns to scale technology (° = 0) which will help in understanding the in-
creasing returns cases.
3.1.1 Constant returns to scale and ! = 0
When I set ! = 0, the four eigenvalues of M are
½




1¡ ¯(1¡ ®)(1¡ ±); ¿ ; 0
¾
:
The eigenvalues are the same as those reported in Carlstrom and Fuerst
(2000) despite the absence of variable capital utilization and variable capital
depreciation in their model. The third eigenvalue exposes the policy’s direct
impact on dynamics: policy-induced indeterminacy can be avoided simply
by responding aggressively to past in‡ation whereas passive responses lead
to multiplicity. The reasoning for the occurrence of sunspot equilibria can
be understood as follows: suppose that current in‡ation increases by one
percent, which given an aggressive policy, implies that the t + 1 nominal
rate goes up by more than one percent. The in‡ation tax depresses future
consumption and lifts current consumption – the real rate goes down. This,
however, is only possible when the rate of in‡ation, ¼t+1, increases. As a
result, the central bank’s target Rt+2 rises by even more and policy induces
an unsustainable explosive in‡ation-pattern. The initial rise in in‡ation is
not supported and consequently the sunspot cycle is stopped. In contrast, if
the bank follows a passive policy, the chain of events remains stationary and
sunspot expectations are self-ful…lled.
Figure 2 shows the impulse response dynamics of real output and of the
nominal interest rate after a one-time positive shock to consumption. The
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Figure 2: Shock to consumption demand
monetary policy is the only source of indeterminacy. The positive shock to
consumption demand induces a contractionary output response. Economic
activity falls at impact; the direction of output’s response is not surpris-
ing given the assumptions of market-clearing, perfectly ‡exible prices and
constant returns to scale. Labor demand is downward-sloping, thus, the pos-
itive consumption shock decreases labor input. Furthermore, the transitory
consumption boom is in‡ationary and the next period’s nominal rate goes
up. Indeterminacy when arising from the central bank’s policy appears not to
generate an empirically plausible output response to demand innovations (see
for example Blanchard and Quah, 1989). At least for the speci…c model con-
sidered here, the analysis suggests that increasing returns (or sticky prices)
are required to produce a (more) realistic output reaction to real-side demand
shocks.7
3.1.2 Constant returns to scale and ! > 0
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000) do not consider the e¤ects of output-targeting
on the economy’s dynamics. This will be done here next as a further step
towards an understanding of Taylor rules in suboptimal equilibria. Suppose
that the central bank reacts in part to past movements in output, ! > 0.
Dynamics can be derived analytically within two special cases. The …rst
assumes a simpli…ed economy without capital and in which output is pro-
duced with the linear technology
yt = Alt
7The same picture arises when the interest rate is shocked so as to mimic changes in
monetary policy.
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or simply ® ! 0. The model reduces to the scalar equation
Et bRt+2 = (¿ ¡ !)bRt+1:
Indeterminacy arises for parameter constellations that satisfy
! ¡ 1 < ¿ < 1 + !: (8)
The right-hand-side inequality in (8) repeats the aforementioned result. Namely
that active in‡ation-…ghting policies eliminate sunspot equilibria. More gen-
erally, the central bank must simultaneously select both policy parameters
because an intermediate range of ¿ values that generates indeterminacy for
given ! exists. Put in another way, letting for example ¿ = 1:5, the bank’s
output-coupled response must fall outside 1=2 < ! < 2:5 otherwise policy-
induced cycles crop up.
The picture becomes slightly more complex once the complete model is
considered. By employing another special case, namely ± ! 1 as in Mc-
Callum (1989), the basic insights can be derived from tractable analytical
expressions.8 The four eigenvalues of M are
(
®;
1 + ®¯ §
p





It is quite instructive to consider ¿ = 1, in which the central bank follows
neither a passive nor an active policy. We can then ask what is the separate






; ¿ ; 0
¾
and the economy would drift into the indeterminacy zone by decreasing ¿ .
It is easy to see that by increasing !, the third eigenvalue
1 + ®¯ ¡
p
(1¡ ®¯)(1¡ ®¯(1¡ 4!))
2®¯
will be pushed inside the unit circle. Indeterminacy arises and analogously
to the above simpli…ed model, there is also an upper level of !
! >
2(1 + ®¯)
1¡ ®¯ > 0
8By allowing 0 < ± < 1, the same results apply but for presentational ease, I report











Figure 3: Sunspot zones when returns to scales are constant; backward-
looking rules.
at which determinacy enters again since two eigenvalues will have modulus
larger than one.9 If on the other hand, ¿ ! 0, determinacy is obtained for
! >
1 + ®¯
1¡ ®¯ > 0:
Here the result from the capital-free version of the economy repeated: output-
targeting alone can produce determinacy. However, it should not be chosen
in a ”medium range” otherwise sunspot cycles arise. Figure 3 summarizes.
Indeterminacy from output-targeting arises as follows. Suppose again
that current in‡ation increases. Future nominal interest rates will rise which
will increase today’s consumption (see also Figure 2). Therefore, the labor
supply curve shifts inward which, since the capital stock is given, lowers
current output. Accordingly, the future interest rate will rise by less than






As a consequence, stationary sunspot sequences become more likely when
the central bank targets output. These sunspot sequences are only possible
when the !-weights fall into a certain range. Very small values of ! – in com-
bination with aggressive in‡ation-targeting – deliver determinacy. For very
large !-values, the output-related movements will be too strong to preserve
stationarity and sunspots can be ruled out again.10
9Another way to see this is by noting that as ! ! 1, the expressions under the square
roots go to in…nity.
10Numerically, in the full model with 0 < ± < 1, ! must be larger than 30 (see also
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3.1.3 Increasing returns to scale
Next, I turn to cases in which the economy is imperfect and subject to
real indeterminacy stemming from production externalities. That is, I will
discuss how the determinacy properties of the Wen (1998) model change
when a monetary policy rule is introduced. The question I ask is: can the
central bank stamp out externality-generated sunspot equilibria by choosing
an appropriate Taylor-design?
When the central bank reacts to in‡ationary movements only, indetermi-
nacy arising from mild production externalities cannot be eliminated. This
can easily be seen by numerically checking for the minimum increasing re-
turns for alternative ¿ -values (other parameters are as in Table 1). These
returns to scale are 1 at ¿ ! 0, they jump to 1:103708061 at ¿ = 1 and are
1:103734395 at ¿ = 1000000. I therefore shift attention to cases involving
! > 0.
Generally, once ° > 0, analytical versions of the eigenvalues become
highly non-linear in ° (and the other key parameters) and, thus o¤er only
limited insights. Yet by assuming ± ! 1, one can show how monetary policy
must include targeting output in order to eliminate indeterminacy. Consider
the case in which in‡ation-targeting is neither active nor passive, ¿ = 1 (to
simplify notation). Then the matrix M’s eigenvalues at ! = 0 are
(
0; 1;
(¡1 + ¯(1 + ®(1 + °)(®(1 + ¯)¡ 1))§
p
¡2 ¡ 4®¯¢
2®¯(¯(1 + °)¡ 1)
)
¡ ´ 1¡ ¯(1¡ ®)(1 + ®(1 + °))¡ ®¯2(® + ®(1 + °))
¢ ´ (1¡ ¯(1 + °))(®(1¡ ¯) + (1 + ®¡ ¯(1 + 3® + ®¯))°):
Simple algebra delivers the minimum increasing returns
°¤ =
(1 + ®)(1¡ ¯)(1 + ®¯)
1¡ ¯ + ®2¯(1¡ ¯) + ®(4¯ + ¯ ¡ 1)
at which indeterminacy kicks in. At this point, the four eigenvalues are
½
0; 1;¡1; 1 + ® ¡ ¯ ¡ 2®¯ ¡ ®
3¯2(2¡ ¯) + ®3¯(3¡ ¯(2¡ ¯))
®¯(1 + ®(1¡ ¯(3¡ ®))
¾
and the third eigenvalue crosses into the unit circle for increasing returns
higher than °¤.11 While holding …xed the threshold level of increasing re-
Figure 5).
11The fourth eigenvalue has modulus less than one for
1 ¡ 2¯ ¡ ¯2 ¡
p
1 ¡ 16¯ + 18¯2 + ¯4
2¯(¯ ¡ 3) < ® <
1 ¡ 2¯ ¡ ¯2 +
p

















Figure 4: In‡ation and output targeting under increasing returns to scale
(° = 0:11), backward-looking rules.
turns – numerically, the value is 1:0144 – I introduce output-targeting. In
particular, by boosting ! ! 1, the eigenvalues become
f0; ®;1;1g :
That is, policies that are su¢ciently o¤ensive in countering output move-
ments help to rule out indeterminacy (numerically, determinacy already
arises for ! > 0:03834).
The availability of tractable analytical expressions is highly dependent on
speci…c parameter assumptions; a way of circumventing this is by employing
numerical solutions. Let us step up ° to 0:11 so that production complemen-
tarities induce sunspot equilibria in environments without money (the other
parameters are as in Table 1). The speci…c value draws on Benhabib and
Wen (2003) who propose it by observing that the model’s cycle frequency
matches that of U.S. output. Furthermore, the magnitude of scale economies
falls into the scope of the studies mentioned in Section 2.3.
Figure 4 pins down the policy advice under the assumption of ° = 0:11.
The only way for the central bank to tackle endogenous cycles that arise
from the production externalities is by working against output movements:
if ! = 0, indeterminacy always occurs. The Figure also shows that for
any given ¿ , the output-related response must be su¢ciently large to obtain
unique solutions: even when ! takes on strictly positive values, the speci…c
choice of ¿ may imply any of the three possible regimes (indeterminacy,
which is plausible (for example, when setting the discount factor at 0:99, the capital share




















Figure 5: Output-targeting versus minimum increasing returns to scale (at
alternative values for ¿ and calibration as in Table 1); backward-looking
rules.
determinacy or source – the latter region may imply endogenous cycles on its
own). In agreement with the above analytical experiment, monetary policies
that are very o¤ensive with respect to output ‡uctuations (i.e. ! ! 1) are
generally a good insurance against indeterminacy.
Figure 5 generates determinacy-indeterminacy-loci in the ° ¡ !¡space
for alternative degrees of in‡ation-targeting. The graph shows that (i) the
minimum degree of output-targeting falls when increasing returns , (ii) it
rises with the degree of in‡ation-targeting and (iii) it must be substantial to
generate determinacy at constant returns and increasing returns (! > 30).12
The result that output-targeting eliminates sunspot equilibria is reminis-
cent of Guo and Lansing (1998) and Christiano and Harrison (1999) who
…nd that progressive tax systems e¤ectively eliminate indeterminacy by tax-
ing away increasing returns in real economies. The Taylor policy suggested
here generates a similar distortionary e¤ect. The economic reasoning is easy
to see: if ! is su¢ciently large, then output ‡uctuations (i.e. production
bunching) that arise from believing in them simply become too costly. Let
us walk through a sunspot sequence that is stopped by the central bank for
further understanding of the result. Suppose that people embellish optimistic
expectations without any real cause. By projecting high future income, they
will ratchet up today’s consumption expenditures. The high increasing re-
12There exists a lower bound for every ¿ -value under which determinacy holds. For
¿ = 1=2 (¿ = 1) the threshold does not involve positive values of ! and therefore was not
plotted. Moreover, for ¿ < 1, the minimum ! increases again after passing through the
threshold level °min:
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turns will increase today’s employment and output as a result of the upward
sloping equilibrium labor demand curve. Now, if the output response of
the central bank is strong enough, then Rt+1 will increase and the initially
sanguine expectations will be preempted (i) by increasing the costs of hiring
labor (Equation 3) and (ii) by reducing t+1 consumption demand (Equation
5) which will lower t+ 1 employment. The initially optimistic expectations
are not ful…lled and the sunspot cycle is broken.
To conclude, the analysis of backward-looking rules suggests that cen-
tral banks should be careful about the speci…c economic environment when
setting policy rules. I …nd that Carlstrom and Fuerst’s (2000) advocated
backward-looking in‡ation-targeting rule no longer guarantees uniqueness. It
is imperative for the interest rate to intercept output ‡uctuations. Further-
more, the (numerical) analysis suggests that Taylor’s (1993) original principle
(¿ = 1:5 and ! = 0:5) constitutes a successful code of stabilizing sunspot
‡uctuations at ° = 0:11. However, if increasing returns are slightly smaller –
say, at ° = 0:10 – or constant then the economy skids into a regime under the
clout of sunspots. A decidedly aggressive output-targeting is only successful
preemptive strategy that comes out of both technological regimes’ analyses.
Proposition 1 (Backward-looking rules) The central bank can rule out in-
determinacy by aggressively targeting in‡ation when returns to scale are con-
stant. However, the presence of mild production externalities requires a tough
stand on output in order to eliminate indeterminacy. Only policies that very
aggressively target (past) output have the potential of ruling out indetermi-
nacy independent of the degree of market imperfections.
3.2 Indeterminacy zones with forward looking rules
It may be suspected that the result is dependent on assuming a backward-
looking policy rule. Yet, the general picture that Taylor rule settings should
consider technology does not change when the central bank pays attention
to expected values such as in
bRt = ¿Etb¼t+1 + !Etbyt+1 ¿ ¸ 0 ! ¸ 0: (9)
















which involves the two jump-variables bct+1 and bRt+1.
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3.2.1 Constant returns to scale and ! = 0
Beginning with the case of ! = ° = 0, the three eigenvalues of J are
½








which reverses the results obtained under backward-looking rules: all policy
responses ¿ > 1 are precluded, so it is necessary for policy to be passive in
Taylor’s sense. The underlying economics are easy to grasp. The real rate is
given by (using equation 8)




It decreases when current (sunspot-driven) consumption rises. For ¿ > 1,
the fall in the real rate translates into a fall of the nominal rate. Thus, the
in‡ation-consumption distortion declines and the sunspot cycle is completed.
3.2.2 Constant returns to scale and ! > 0
Let us turn to cases involving ! > 0. Resorting again to a linear production





from which more general Taylor formulas can be discussed analytically: de-
terminacy requires
¿ > ! ¡ 1 for ¿ < !
or
¿ < ! + 1 for ¿ > !:
Now there are two zones of indeterminacy. Again, if ! = 0, the monetary
authority should be passive when responding to expected in‡ation. If ¿ !
0, the monetary authority should be passive when responding to expected
output. Moreover, monetary policy should respond in tendency equally to
output and to in‡ation. Asymmetric responses will likely drive the economy
into sunspot districts.
Consider next the more general case with capital accumulation (and ± !
1). The three eigenvalues of J are
f®; ¿ ¡ ! + ®¯(1 + !)§
p




Four special cases will demonstrate the e¤ect of policy. If ¿ ! 0, it is easy
to see that the second and third eigenvalues approach in…nity and sunspot




and contrary to the backward-looking case, active in‡ation-targeting pro-
duces indeterminacy. Of course, this mimics the simpli…ed version’s policy








and dynamics are determined by ¿ 7 1. The eigenvalues are
f®; 0;1g
if ! ! 1 which again suggests a passive output-response. In particular,
there is an upper level, !¤,
! > !¤ =
1 + ¿ + ®¯(1 + ¿ )
1¡ ®¯ > 0
for which indeterminacy always applies. In sum, policy should not be too
aggressive. The economic reasoning for this indeterminacy is easy to under-
stand. Suppose policy is aggressive. A sunspot-driven increase in consump-
tion lowers the real rate and given ¿ > 1 it also lowers the nominal rate. The
rise in consumption will decrease labor supply and therefore output. Current
investment falls and next period’s capital stock will be smaller. Thus, it is
likely that future output is lower as well – there will be downward pressure on
the current nominal rate. If the fall of Rt is su¢cient because policy reacts
sharply to the output ‡uctuations, the sunspot cycle cannot be broken.
3.2.3 Increasing returns to scale
Let us now go through the increasing returns to scale scenario. Beginning
with the case ¿ = 1 and ! = 0, the eigenvalues are
f1; ¡1 + ° + ®
2¯2(1 + °) + ¯ (1 + (1 + 2®) ° ¡ ®2(1 + °))§
p
£+ ¤2
2(®¯2(1 + °)¡ ®¯) g
£ ´ 4®2¯(1¡ (1 + °)¯)(¯ ¡ 1 + (2¯ ¡ 1)°)























and eigenvalues at °¤ and ! = 0 are
f¡1; 1;¡ 1¡ ®(3¡ ¯) + ®¯
1 + ®¡ 3®¯ + ®2¯g
where the third eigenvalue’s modulus is smaller than one. Now, by hold-
ing everything else constant and by letting ! go to in…nity, the eigenvalues
become
f0; ®;1g:
This implies that simply following (very) aggressive in‡ation-targeting does
not bring about determinacy. This is the antithesis of the backward-looking
policy’s proposal.
The result can also be derived by turning to numerical solutions. Sup-
pose that production externalities are ° = 0:11. Figure 6 plots determinacy
regions in the ¿ ¡ !-space. Uniqueness requires a tough policy with respect
to in‡ation which must be backed up by a relatively mild response to output.
Moreover, the constant returns proposal (¿ < 1) always creates sunspot equi-
libria now, thus, the policy advice is di¤erent across technological regimes.
For example, if the central bank sets ¿ = 1:5, then sunspot cycles are os-
tracized for weak output-targeting 0:12 < ! < 0:42. However, at slightly
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smaller externalities at which indeterminacy does not arise from technology,
say at ° = 0:10, that very policy creates indeterminacy.
The economics behind the result are parallel to those in Section 3.1.:
active interest rate policy can be used to counter the bene…ts of production
bunching and is therefore capable to automatically stabilizing the economy.
Proposition 2 (Forward-looking rules) At constant returns to scale, passive
policies rule out sunspot equilibria. In the presence of mild production exter-
nalities, output-targeting does not create determinacy alone and it must be
supported by aggressive in‡ation-targeting.
3.3 Indeterminacy with current-looking rules
Let us next consider current-looking rules of the form
bRt = ¿b¼t + !byt ¿ ¸ 0 ! ¸ 0:















3.3.1 Constant returns to scale and ! = 0





1¡ ¯(1¡ ®)(1¡ ±) ;




It is easy to show that the …rst two eigenvalues are always inside the unit
circle. Since the underlying dynamical system involves two jump variables,
the economy is always subject to indeterminacy.
3.3.2 Constant returns to scale and ! > 0
There is always indeterminacy even when output is targeted by the central




1¡ (1¡ ®)¯(1¡ ±) ;




















Figure 7: Indeterminacy and determinacy regions when mild production ex-
ternalities (° = 0:11) are present; current-looking rules.
The …rst two eigenvalues are always inside the unit circle. In fact, they do
not even contain the parameter !. Therefore, the upshot appears to be a
clear case against using current-looking rules either with or without output-
targeting. This is easy to understand from the simpli…ed version of the model.
The dynamics boil down to
0 =
1 + ! ¡ ¿
1 + !
Etb¼t+1
which implies that future rates of in‡ation are pinned down. However, the
initial rate, b¼t, is not pinned down. The same holds for period t’s nominal
interest rate. Real indeterminacy arises.
3.3.3 Increasing returns
The picture changes, however, when ° > °min. Figure 7 plots determinacy
regions while setting ° = 0:11. Now there exists an area in which applying
a current-looking Taylor rule can eliminate sunspot equilibria. In a nutshell,
the central bank must react su¢ciently to output and (to a lesser extent) to
in‡ation.
Current-looking rules may therefore be a channel that eliminates sunspot
‡uctuations that arise from scale economies. In a sense, the result parallels
Christiano (2000). He …nds that – in the neighborhood of the high level
steady state – a policy that sets the nominal interest rate proportional to
current employment can stabilize the economy. The current economy with a
more realistic departure from constant returns to scale places a much more
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stringent requirement on policy. In fact, output-targeting must su¢ciently
lean-against-the-wind and always be supported by in‡ation-targeting.
Proposition 3 (Current-looking rules) Current-looking rules always imply
indeterminacy at constant returns to scale. Indeterminacy arising from mild
externalities can be eliminated by aggressive output-targeting (in combination
with in‡ation-targeting).
To conclude, Section 3 has shown that various formulations of the Taylor
rule generate very di¤erent economic dynamics depending on the economic
environment. In particular, the presence of market imperfections (produc-
tion externalities or monopolistic competition) inverts the policy recommen-
dations that apply when these market imperfections are not present. This
implies that pinning down the empirical degree of imperfections in actual
economies may turn out to be an integral part of designing monetary policy.
4 Extensions
This section presents extensions on recently promoted interest rate smoothing
policies as well as policy-results using a money-in-utility framework.
4.1 Nominal interest rate smoothing
Empirical studies on the Taylor rule generally include the lagged interest rate.
In what follows I will explore determinacy properties of interest smoothing
in a forward-looking and a backward-looking Taylor rule. The motivation
arises from recent theoretical work that has suggested that indeterminacy
can be relinquished by adding lagged values of the nominal interest rate to
the standard Taylor-rule (see for example Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999,
Giannoni and Woodford, 2002, and Benhabib et al., 2003).
4.1.1 Nominal interest rate smoothing and forward-looking in‡ation-
targeting
Let us …rst consider hybrid Taylor-type rules such as
bRt = ½ bRt¡1 + ¿Etb¼t+1 + !byt (10)
in which the parameter ½ stands for interest rate smoothing (the formulation
applies Clarida, Gali and Gertler’s, 1998, baseline case which they estimate
for serveral central banks). Generally, estimates of (10) …nd a high degree of
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inertia and slightly greater than one-for-one increases in the nominal rate in
response to in‡ation. Furthermore, the response to the output gap is mostly
found to be small for the U.S. post-1980 period. Therefore, let us consider the
case ! = 0. Under constant returns to scale, the following four eigenvalues
depict the dynamics
½













(which involves two jump variables). The …rst two eigenvalues split around
the unit circle. If ½ = 0; the third eigenvalue is zero and the policy should
be passive; of course, the argument simply repeats the …nding for forward-





and cross the unit circle at
½00 = 1¡ ¿:
We see from the ½00-condition, that depending purely on a passive rule no
longer guarantees determinacy since, ceteris paribus, large values of ½ push
the economy out of the determinacy region. Empirical evidence points to
central bank policies such as ½ ¼ 0:85 and ¿ ¼ 1:1 – my analysis suggests
that banks should avoid these policies to not create endogenous ‡uctuations.
Figure 8 shows the determinacy regions for (i) constant returns to scale and
(ii) ° = 0:11. The two areas do not overlap which underlines the central
bank’s dilemma. Taylor-rule prescriptions concerning the smoothing param-
eter di¤er across technological regimes: under constant returns the policy’s
response should be passive whereas strong interest rate smoothing will elim-
inate sunspot equilibria when increasing returns to scale are operating.
4.1.2 Nominal interest rate smoothing and backward-looking in‡ation-
targeting
Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and Giannoni and Woodford (2002) have
suggested that backward-looking Taylor rules’ performances can be improved
by adding lagged values of the nominal interest rate. In particular, they
consider the rule













Figure 8: The e¤ect of interest smoothing: determinacy regions with constant
returns to scale (CRS) and increasing returns to scale (° = 0:11). The regions
do not overlap.
and …nd that a smoothing coe¢cient, ½, greater than one guarantee unique
equilibria. Let us again begin by assuming constant returns to scale and
endogenous capital accumulation (the above mentioned papers by Giannoni,
Rotemberg and Woodford abstract from capital). The dynamics are charac-
terized by the four eigenvalues
½




1¡ ¯(1¡ ®)(1¡ ±) ; ¿ + ½; 0
¾
:
The parameters ¿ and ½ enter in complementary fashion and determinacy
simply requires that ¿ + ½ > 1 (the underlying dynamical system has two
jump variables). Thus, ½ > 1 is indeed a su¢cient condition for ruling out
indeterminacy and the result carries over to the current perfectly ‡exible
price, cash-in-advance model. However, the advice given is no longer valid
once market imperfections are present: there are no (¿ ; ½)-constellation that
deliver determinacy at ° = 0:11. For example, with ¿ = ½ = 1000000, the
four eigenvalues are
f0; 0:8625§ 0:2913i; 2 ¢ 106g:
Once again, the presence of market imperfections has nontrivial e¤ects on
the design of monetary policy: pushing up the smoothing parameter, ½, no
longer guarantees the elimination of indeterminacy.
Proposition 4 (Interest rate smoothing) The exact dose of interest rate
smoothing needed to rule out sunspot ‡uctuations is highly dependent on the
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speci…c technological environment. Moreover, the analysis suggests that no
prescription can be found that secures a stable economy under both constant
and increasing returns to scale.
4.2 What if money enters the utility function?
One may argue that the preceding analysis has rested solely on the distor-
tionary e¤ects of in‡ation arising in cash-in-advance models. It is therefore
a straightforward question to ask if the results carry over to money-in-utility
frameworks (MIU).13 For CIA and MIU classes of models, Carlstrom and
Fuerst (2001) conclude:
”[...] that central banks should use either current or backward–
looking Taylor rules.” [Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2001, p. 296]
They do not allow for increasing returns and assume that ! = ½ = 0.
These assumptions are relaxed here. In line with the standard timing con-
vention on real balances – cash-when-you-are-done as coined by Carlstrom
and Fuerst (2001) – the agents’ period utility function is given by






To eliminate the other distortion as well, I no longer assume that the …rms
must acquire cash borrowed at the short term rate from an intermediate
sector to …nance their wage bills. I will stress on backward-looking Taylor

















Let us begin with the simple case ° = ½ = 0. I also assume that ± ! 1.




®(1 + ¿ + ½)§
p
4¿ + (1 + ¿ + ½)2®2 + 4®(½+ 2¿ )
2
; 0g:
13A complete discussion of Taylor rules, externalities and MIU is beyond the scope of
this paper.
14The Appendix contains a description of the model equation.
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It is easy to see that this parallels the cash-in-advance case: if the cen-
tral bank raises the nominal interest rate more (less) than one-for-one with
in‡ation, the model is determinate (indeterminate). Thus, an aggressive
in‡ation-targeting rule is su¢cient to stabilize the economy. Another way of
…xing determinacy is resolute interest rate smoothing. It is straightforward
to see that the second (third) eigenvalue approaches zero (in…nity) as ½ ! 1.
That is, independently of the degree of in‡ation-targeting, unique equilibria
arise.
These results change once increasing returns are introduced. By using
° = 0:11 and the other parameters taken from Table 1, determinacy requires
that the in‡ation response falls into the ”passive corridor” 0:3414 < ¿ < 1 (at
! = ½ = 0). For less passive rules, indeterminacy arises and for aggressive
rules three eigenvalues are outside the unit circle. In the latter case, the
model becomes unstable and endogenous cycles may emerge.
A way of eradicating externality-based endogenous cycles can be con-
structed by smoothing the nominal interest rate. For
° > °¤ =
1
¯




(numerically, °¤ equals 0:0066) only one eigenvalue is strictly inside the unit
circle.15 Adding interest rate smoothing may reinstate unique dynamics. At
°¤, the eigenvalues are
f0;¡1; 1; 1¡ 3(1¡ ®)¯ ¡ 2®
2¯2 ¡ ®2¯3
®¯(1¡ (2¡ ®)¯ +
®¯(1¡ ®¯)
®¯(1¡ (2¡ ®)¯½g:
The last eigenvalue crosses into the unit circle at
½ =
¯(3(1¡ ®)¡ ®¯)¡ 1
®¯
(numerically ½ = 4:623) and moves out of the unit circle at
½ =
®(2 + ®)¯2 + (3¡ 4®)¯ ¡ ®2¯3 ¡ 1
®¯(1¡ ®¯)
(numerically ½ = 6:5661). That is, interest rate smoothing only helps to
stabilize the economy if the central bank is able to identify the correct dose
of the smoothing.
15At °¤ and ¿ = ± = 1, the eigenvalues are
f0; ¡1; 1; 1 ¡ 3(1 ¡ ®)¯ ¡ 2®
2¯2 ¡ ®2¯3
®¯(1 ¡ (2 ¡ ®)¯) g:
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5 Concluding remarks
Recent literature on Taylor rules has suggested that the monetary authority
should adopt aggressive, backward-looking rules. For example, Carlstrom
and Fuerst (2000) advise that
”[t]o avoid doing harm, the central bank should place most
weight on past movements in the in‡ation rate.” [Carlstrom and
Fuerst, 2000, p. 22]
The present paper has shown that we must be very careful with any gener-
alized proposals. There are many dimensions, i.e. the modelling assumptions
on the monetary side (Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2000, 2001) and the real side
of the economy (the current paper), that have an impact on monetary pol-
icy’s e¤ects and that should accordingly be considered before spelling out a
speci…c policy.
To demonstrate this, I have added a cash-in-advance superstructure to
an otherwise well speci…ed dynamic general equilibrium model that generates
indeterminacy by externalities. Once increasing returns are present, most of
the policy proposals contained in the existing literature – such as the ones
prescribed by Carlstrom and Fuerst – are ‡ipped on its head. For example,
when formulating the Taylor-policy on past observations, in‡ation-targeting
will not eliminate sunspot equilibria and aggressive output-targeting is re-
quired. Furthermore, rules which should be avoided (chosen) in perfect mar-
ket environments often ensure (yield) unique (multiple) rational expectations
solutions in alternative settings.
To summarize, essential information on how monetary design should be
framed in practice must be inferred from empirical estimates of market im-
perfections. Unfortunately, the existing work on the issue does not o¤er a
clear cut answer – the measurement of the degree of increasing returns is sim-
ply too imprecise – which given my results poses a dilemma for the central
bank. Cole and Ohanian (1999) suggest a basic problem for the ambiguity:
insu¢cient variations in factor inputs. They conclude that currently avail-
able methods are not adequate to return estimates of scale economies such
that we can eventually draw a conclusive diagnosis against or in favor of
models with indeterminacy such as those summarized in footnote 1. I con-
clude that estimates on scale economies that are currently available are also
not adequate to square con‡icting Taylor-policy proposals.
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6 Appendix






















Calibrating ´, ®, ±; ¯; l determines c=y, u, y=k, µ, R and ¼. Yet, not all these
are needed in the approximated version of the model with is the collection
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of seven equations
byt = ®(1 + °)but + ®(1 + °)bkt + (1¡ ®)(1 + °)blt
blt = byt ¡ bct + bRt
µbut = byt ¡ bkt
¡bct ¡ bRt














bRt + bct = Etb¼t+1 + Etbct+1
The backward-oriented rule
bRt+1 = ¿b¼t + !byt
together with the Fisher-equation implies










































































M ´ [M1 +M2R]¡1 [M3 +M4R]
and M is 4£ 4. Forward-looking rules
bRt = ¿Etb¼t+1 + !Etbyt+1
imply the Fisher-equation






















The matrix J is 3£ 3. A current-looking rule
bRt = ¿b¼t + !byt
implies the Fisher-equation






















W is 3£ 3. Finally, the hybrid-rule



















The simpli…ed version of the money-in-utility version without capital is
as follows. The labor market and Fisher equations imply
´
ct







) ¼t+1 = ¯Rt:
Inserting the backward-looking Taylor rule
Rt = R (¼t¡1=¼)
¿
yields the linear model
Etb¼t+1 = ¿b¼t¡1:
The dynamics are determinate (indeterminate) for ¿ > 1 (0 < ¿ < 1) as in






is – as a result of the separability in utility – redundant with respect to pin
down the in‡ation-sequence. However, whenever indeterminacy arises, the
nominal interest rate and therefore real cash-balances ‡uctuate with changes
in non-fundamental expectations.
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